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We explore the relationship between the level of village inequality in 1986, and the subsequent growth of 
household incomes from 1986 to 1999. Using a detailed household-level data set from rural China, we 
find robust evidence that initial inequality is negatively related to subsequent household income growth. 
We are able to address a number of econometric issues that affect the use of aggregate data for this 
exercise, especially measurement error and aggregation: Our results strongly suggest that village 
inequality has an external adverse impact on household-level income trajectories. However, once we 
account for possibly fixed village-level unobserved heterogeneity, we find no evidence that changes in 
inequality are correlated with household income growth: Whatever factor drives the inequality-growth 
relationship only operates in the “long run.” We explore several possible avenues by which initial 
inequality – or an unobserved variable correlated with it – affects household income growth. While we do 
not find the precise mechanism, our findings point toward a class of explanations based on collective 
choice (like the provision of public goods or determination of local taxes), and away from credit-market 
based explanations.  
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1.0 Introduction 
nequality increased in rural China during the period of economic reform which began more 
than twenty-five years ago: The Gini coefficient is now around 0.45, versus 0.30 in the mid-
1980s, and somewhere between 0.20 and 0.25 in the pre-reform period. With broadly 
improving living standards, there was initially little concern over the rise in income inequality. 
But levels of inequality now exceed the comfort levels of many policy observers.
1 Aside from 
plausible concerns over political unrest, is there evidence that higher inequality can damage 
economic outcomes, like future growth?
 Past research on growth and inequality suggests so, but 
there is debate on the nature and robustness of cross-country evidence, and questions about the 
applicability of micro-based studies drawn from other countries. 
  China is an excellent laboratory to explore potential linkages between inequality and 
growth, and not just because there has been significant time-series movement of the two key 
variables. Thousands of villages comprise the political and economic building blocks of rural 
China, and these villages began the reform period with different levels and distributions of 
endowments, village institutions, and culture. Our objective is to determine whether these initial 
village conditions–notably the level of inequality–are correlated with the subsequent post-reform 
economic development of households living in those villages. While our analysis bears on the 
current understanding of inequality-growth linkages in China, our results also inform more 
general discussions of whether and how inequality can affect the evolution of economic 
outcomes.  
We employ a household survey that tracks a panel of 100 rural villages from 1986 to 
1999, including a subset of panel households. This survey has two key benefits. First, with access 
to household-level data across several time periods, we can construct a rich, comparable panel of 
villages that can be used to address a host of econometric and empirical issues that dog those 
researchers using aggregate cross-country data. We use this village-level data set to estimate a 
village-level regression of growth on initial inequality that serves as the organizing principle in 
our empirical work. Second, and most importantly, by exploiting the household dimension of the 
panel, we can link the evolution of household-level welfare to initial conditions in the village. 
This allows us to better establish whether village-level inequality exerts a negative externality on 
household income growth, and also to determine whether inequality affects households 
differentially within the same village. 
                                                 
1 Official concern with rising inequality is evident in the official aim of “creating a harmonious society”, 
articulated in the 10
th (2001-2005) and 11
th (2006-2010) Five-Year Plans. See the UNDP (2005), World 
Bank (2003), and Hutzler (2003) for more general discussions of policy concern with rising inequality. 
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  Why might local inequality affect household income growth? The two channels typically 
proposed operate either through imperfect credit markets, or the political process. We suggest a 
number of reasons why these factors might operate at the level of Chinese villages. We next 
describe the “ideal experiment” that would enable us to identify the effect of inequality on 
growth: A Chinese Robin Hood assigns initial incomes (or factor endowments) to households 
within villages, setting them on their way through the reform process. With this as a benchmark, 
we discuss a long list of potential econometric problems that might plague our regression of 
income growth on initial village conditions. We address two main problems: 1) Measurement 
error; and 2) Unobserved heterogeneity. The first is relatively easy to deal with through 
measurement-error-inspired instruments that we construct using the household-level data. The 
second is more difficult, and we discuss the assumptions that must hold for a second set of 
instruments to serve their purpose. Since the instruments may be inadequate, we also employ 
village-fixed effects to absorb the heterogeneity that may contaminate the cross-section 
regression. We thus provide estimates using procedures that mirror those in the broader literature. 
  We find robust evidence of an economically significant negative link between initial 
inequality and subsequent growth: villages with higher inequality in 1986 grew more slowly over 
the next thirteen years. We do not, however, find that rising inequality is related to the growth 
trajectory: In village fixed-effects specifications, there is no statistical relationship between 
inequality and growth. This suggests that the mechanism linking growth to inequality operates “in 
the long run,” and is differenced-out over shorter periods of time. In addition to growing slower, 
we also find that more unequal villages had the slowest non-agricultural development, and that 
economic activity was tilted more towards agriculture over the period. In many respects, we find 
that low inequality mimics the effect of village education, leading to higher income growth, 
especially of non-farm incomes. To better understand the long-run relationship, we return to the 
household-level, to see whether village inequality interacts with household initial conditions: Are 
poor families at the greatest disadvantage in a high inequality village? We find no evidence of 
this. The inequality externality seems to affect all households the same way.  
  To better understand the possible channels by which inequality might affect growth, we 
finish with a set of explorations of relationships between village “institutions” and initial 
inequality. While we do not find a “smoking gun,” our combined evidence allows us to rule out 
the simplest credit-market based explanations, and points instead towards political-economy / 
public-choice based explanation. We therefore cast a wide net, trying to find the key features of 
local taxation or public goods that characterize more equal villages. Again, we don’t find a single 
factor that explains everything, but we are able to rule out several competing hypotheses, such as Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 3 
the importance of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), in promoting non-farm income 
growth in more equal villages. Although we don’t find that the level of taxation or public 
expenditure is correlated with initial inequality, we do find that low inequality villages have more 
progressive taxes. This provides a hint that village governance may be affected by income 
inequality. 
  What do we learn? Most importantly, we establish a robust set of “facts” that need to be 
incorporated into stories linking growth to inequality in rural China. These facts do not point to a 
specific simple story, but they weigh against others, especially those that rely on heterogeneous 
outcomes for households with different resources, such as imperfect credit markets.  Nothing in 
our findings suggests that short-run increases in inequality have adverse effects on economic 
growth. To this extent, current concern about rising inequality may be exaggerated. However, our 
results show a longer run link between inequality and growth that is hard to dismiss. To the extent 
that high inequality affects local choices, possibly in the provision of public goods like education, 
or in setting taxes that fall heavily on the poor, Chinese officials have much to be worried about. 
 
2.0 Conceptual Framework 
  Our core regression specifies village-level growth as a function of initial inequality and 
covariates, analogous to the typical cross-country regressions: 
 
lnyvt =0 +1lnyvt1 +2Xvt1 +vGvt1 +uvt      ( 1 )  
 
where  lnyvt  is the growth rate of mean village per capita income for village v between periods 
t-1 and t;  lnyvt1is lagged (or initial) log per capita income,  Xvt1is a vector of village-level 
controls (dated period t-1), and the main variable of interest is Gvt1, a measure of village income 
inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, in period t 1.  
  The key interpretation issue is whyv < 0 , i.e., why might higher inequality villages have 
lower average growth rates?
2 Growth in village average income ultimately depends on the 
underlying household relationship: 
 
lnyhvt =  0 + 1lnyhvt1 + 2Xhvt1 + 3 lnyvt1 + 4Xvt1 +hGvt1 +uhvt        (2) 
 
                                                 
2 See Aghion et al (1999) and Lloyd-Elllis (2003) for excellent summaries of the cross-country inequality 
and growth literature, with detailed discussions of the theoretical linkages between inequality and growth. Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 4 
The additional subscript, h, indexes households in village v, and household-level variables are 
defined analogously to those at the village-level. In this specification, household income growth 
depends on own initial resources, as well as both level and distribution of aggregate resources. 
We could also allow initial income to have a more general, and potentially nonlinear, effect on 
subsequent growth, by including a more general fy hvt1 ()  in the regression. 
  What ideal experiment generates the data that would enable us to consistently estimate 
h ?  Imagine a Chinese “Robin Hood” stealing from a rich family, and giving to a poor one.
3 
This will have two effects. First, it changes the initial incomes of the two households. Second, it 
reduces overall inequality, without changing average village income. The first effect will be 
captured directly in the household-level regression, but at the village level, the two effects will be 
reflected only in the Gini coefficient. 
In order to evaluate the potential consequences of Robin Hood’s intervention, begin by 
assuming that the distribution of village resources (level and inequality) has no independent effect 
on household income growth. Only household resources matter. The impact of the redistribution 
depends on the extent to which own resources (i.e., yhvt1 ) affect the subsequent growth trajectory. 
There are a number of possibilities. With well-functioning credit markets, it may be the case that 
own-resources have no effect on subsequent growth, in which case the redistribution is neutral. At 
the village level, we would not expect the dispersion of household resources to be informative 
about the patterns of household growth. But with imperfect movement of capital across 
households, there are a number of possible outcomes, depending on how own-resources 
determine subsequent growth. It may be the case that growth is increasing in own-resources, 
though at a decreasing rate. The more poor households that exist (for a given average level of 
resources), the more slow-growing households there are. In this case, income redistribution 
increases growth by transferring resources to the poor, unleashing their growth potential (by more 
than rich households’ growth is reduced).
4 At the village-level, high inequality would proxy for a 
high number of slow-growing, poor households. On the other hand, we may observe household 
convergence, whereby poor households actually grow faster.  For a given level of village 
resources, and diminishing marginal productivity of own-resources, lower inequality would be 
associated with lower average growth rates. Inequality has no independent effect on growth, but 
                                                 
3One candidate for “Chinese Robin Hood” is Song Jiang () and the 108 bandits from Mount Liang 
() who feature in the Chinese literary classic The Water Margin () (Shi and Luo, 1365c). The 
Water Margin is also known under the following alternative English titles as All Men are Brothers (Buck, 
1933), Outlaws of the Marsh (Shapiro, 1981), and The 108 Heroes. 
4 The investment opportunities include expansion of family businesses (Stiglitz, 1969, and Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993), or education (human capital). Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 5 
in the aggregate, higher inequality is associated with having more poor households that would (by 
whatever “convergence” mechanism) have higher rates of growth. Clearly, more complex 
predictions can be made if there are non-linearities in the return to initial income.
5 
  In these examples, inequality has no independent effect on household income growth, and 
would be insignificant in a household-level regression controlling for household resources. The 
impact of inequality at the village level is an “artifact” of aggregation, whereby the Gini proxies 
for the underlying heterogeneity of initial household incomes, that, in turn may be correlated with 
subsequent household growth rates. We could observe v  0, even if h = 0. As noted by 
Ravallion (1998) and Deaton (2003), the aggregate-level results may confound true direct effects 
of inequality with those that are an artifact of aggregation. The resulting bias can go either way, 
and reinforces the value of estimating the regression at the household level. 
  Why might inequality exert a negative externality on household income growth, i.e., why 
might  h < 0? In this case, Robin Hood’s intervention affects households besides those 
immediately involved in his redistribution. One channel is through factor markets. Higher income 
inequality (or inequality of land, human, or physical capital) may be associated with imperfect 
competition or other impediments to factor market development (such as credit markets), 
lowering factor returns for the poor. An important strand of empirical research on India has 
identified a number of channels by which lower inequality, especially improved access to land by 
the poor, affects factor markets (like labor markets) and tilts the terms of trade towards the poor.
6 
Another channel is through village political economy: unequal villages may make 
different collective choices. For example, high-inequality villages may adopt more progressive 
tax structures, as low-income households pressure for redistribution in ways that inhibit growth. 
This is the conventional taxation-based story offered by Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Benabou 
(1996), and Persson and Tabellini (1994). Alternatively, the greater homogeneity (equality) of 
households may facilitate consensus for more efficient tax systems, and higher investment in 
public goods and services.
7 There may also be links between the distribution of income, levels of 
education, and the provision of public education.
8 
                                                 
5 Another explanation combines imperfect credit markets with increasing returns (Kaldor, 1956 and 1957). 
Here, concentration of wealth among rich households enhances investment and growth. 
6 Notable examples include: Besley and Burgess (2000), Banerjee, Mookherjee, Munshi, and Ray (2001), 
Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak (2002), and Banerjee and Iyer (2005). 
7Several recent papers suggest that collective action and provision of public goods may be complicated by 
high levels of inequality within communities. See for example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Bardhan, 
Ghatak and Karaivanov (2006), Dayton-Johnson (2000), Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002), and Khwaja 
(2004). With respect to public finance, Sokoloff and Zolt (2005) find that high inequality is correlated with Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 6 
  One important question is whether such political-economy processes operate at the 
village-level in China? Institutionally, the village is an important administrative unit, with many 
collective decisions made at this level.
9 Over the period we examine, village governments 
controlled levers connected to several important variables that could affect household income: 
They allocated land across households, set local taxes, and made investment decisions over local 
infrastructure, like irrigation maintenance, road construction and maintenance, construction of 
elementary schools and provision of water.
10 In an agricultural economy with significant returns 
to education (at least in non-agricultural activities), decisions about the provision of public goods  
can affect the overall success of households. Given the heterogeneity in the evolution of village 
governance, there are a number of political economy channels that could lead to more unequal 
villages following different growth trajectories.   
The focus of our empirical investigation is the estimation of the extent to which 
inequality exerts a purely “external” and independent effect on household income growth. While 
the village-level regression is more manageable, especially in addressing a myriad of econometric 
issues, the external effect of inequality is best informed by household-level data. More 
fundamentally, the observed correlation between inequality and growth may be driven by factors 
other than the exogenous differences in inequality arising from the “Robin Hood” experiment. 
We now discuss why it may be difficult to draw causal inferences from this correlation, and 
potential strategies that can help mitigate these concerns. 
 
3.0 Econometric Issues 
  Our empirical strategy exploits the RCRE survey, based on an initial sample of 
approximately 100 villages, including a significant subset of panel households followed from 
1986 to 1999. An obvious way to estimate the effect of inequality on growth is to construct 
                                                                                                                                                
more regressive taxes, and less funding of local public investments and services. Glaeser (2005) reviews 
evidence suggesting that unequal societies are less likely to have governments that respect property rights. 
8 See, for example, Benabou (1996), or Lloyd-Ellis (2000). This channel may be especially important if 
there are externalities associated with the distribution of education in the economy (e.g., Acemoglu (1996)). 
9Villages are at the lowest rung of the rural administrative hierarchy. Above villages, township and county 
governments have authority over some fees and taxes, and above the county lies the provincial government. 
10 In a recent survey carried out in a hundred villages in five provinces looking at the effect of recent fiscal 
reforms, only 21.3% of village public goods’ investment in 2000 was financed by revenue from higher 
levels of government. The majority of investment came from the village.  See Brandt, Rozelle, and Zhang 
(2005).  With the recent tax-for-fee reform carried out between 2002 and 2004, villages largely lost their 
right to tax. 
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village-level averages of the key variables, then estimate village-level regressions analogous to 
those at the cross-country level: 
 
lnyvt =0 +1lnyvt1 +2Xvt1 +vGvt1 +uvt            (3) 
 
where  lnyvt  is the village growth of per capita income between 1986 and 1999; lnyvt1is village 
initial income in 1986; Gvt1is the Gini coefficient for household per capita income in 1986, and 
Xvt1 are controls for village characteristics in 1986. A key question is whether the OLS 
coefficients bear any relationship to the externality effect we wish to identify. There are several 
reasons why this may not be the case, and to guide the discussion, we decompose the error term: 
 
uvt =v +v +vvt +vt                               (4) 
 
This decomposes uvt  into two village-level “fixed effects,”v +v , one of which may be 
problematic, and two time-varying components, vvt +vt , where one component may pose a 
statistical difficulty. The econometric exercise is to determine the conditions under which these 
error components are correlated with the main regressor, Gvt1. 
 
3.1 Time-Varying Sources of Bias 
For simplicity, assume that vt  is “well-behaved,” so that it represents unobservable 
determinants of village growth that are uncorrelated with the regressors, 
E vt |lnyvt1,Xvt1,Gvt1 [] = 0 . On the other hand, vvt captures time-varying unobservables that 
may render OLS inconsistent, i.e.,  Ev vt |lnyvt1,Xvt1,Gvt1 []  0 . There are a variety of reasons 
why this may be a problem: 
•  Aggregation: We cannot interpret the coefficient on Gvt1 in the village-level regression as 
the direct “externality” impact of inequality without restrictive assumptions concerning the 
functional form. Given that we eventually estimate this regression at the household level 
(specifically to evaluate the importance of aggregation), we set this problem aside. 
•  Omitted Variables (Time Varying): A variety of factors may be correlated with initial 
inequality and ultimately affect growth. For example, high inequality villages might have 
different a economic structure. Shocks (like the collapse of agricultural prices) may reduce 
the growth experience of these villages, while our blame incorrectly falls on higher Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 8 
inequality. Another set of omitted variables may be non-linear functions of initial income: 
lnyvt1may be an insufficient control for initial income, and non-linearities may pile up on the 
Gvt1 coefficient. While we cannot anticipate all possible omitted variables, we make some 
effort to include a rich set of covariates to soak up heterogeneity of initial conditions, 
including additional non-linear functions of initial income. 
•  Measurement Error. There are a number of ways in which measurement error, especially in 
household income, may generate spurious links between initial inequality and subsequent 
growth. For example, we might poorly control for initial income. If we underestimate initial 
income, then mean reversion alone will generate what appears to be “income convergence.” 
This is of no concern to the extent that our focus is inequality. However, if there is a 
correlation between the level of income and its distribution (maybe poor villages are more 
equal), then we will misattribute some of the “convergence”  to low inequality. Alternatively, 
the Gini may reflect village-level measurement error, i.e., high Gini’s correspond to a greater 
number of “outlier” household incomes. Such villages may also have inaccurately high levels 
of initial income (driven by the outliers). With mean-reversion in household incomes, these 
villages will appear to have lower growth rates, even if there is no link between inequality 
and growth. Finally, the greater degree of noise in Gvt1 may result in conventional 
attenuation bias. In any case, it is easy to concoct stories linking inequality to growth that are 
driven by measurement error.  As it turns out, measurement error is a relatively 
straightforward problem to address with instrumental variables. While the instruments may 
be invalid under some conditions, within the narrow confines of a measurement error model, 
we only need to find variables that are correlated with initial incomes and inequality, that are 
themselves independent of the measurement error. Candidate variables include more “robust” 
measures of inequality (less sensitive to outliers), as well as functions of the initial 
distribution of factor endowments. More formally, we denote these measurement-error-
inspired instruments by  Z1vt1, where the instruments satisfyEv vt |Z1vt1,Xvt1 [] = 0, but may 
not be orthogonal to other components of the error term (like v +v ).  As they may be 
functions of  yhvt , there will be limits on the degree to which they are exogenous. 
•  Attrition. Household attrition may be correlated with both initial inequality and subsequent 
growth. For example, there may be selective out-migration, whereby households are more 
likely to leave slow-growing villages. They key question is whether such migration is 
correlated with initial inequality. If out-migration was more common in the high-inequality, 
low-growth potential villages, then depending on which households leave, we might observe Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 9 
a spurious link between initial inequality and the growth rates calculated on the basis of the 
initial sample collected in 1986, and the revised (attrition-affected) sample in 1999. In our 
empirical work, we explore the sensitivity of our results to various accounts for attrition. 
 
3.2 Village Fixed Effects 
As serious as the correlation between time-varying vvt  with Gvt1 may be, the most 
difficult problems concern the village fixed effects, v +v . Again, some of the initial village 
characteristics that affect growth may be uncorrelated with the covariates (or instrumental 
variables) of interest (like initial inequality): v .  Our problems arise with the possibility that 
E v |lnyvt1,Xvt1,Gvt1 []  0 . Low inequality itself has no impact on growth, but proxies for 
some other factor, v. No matter how many covariates we include to control for initial conditions, 
there is always the suspicion that with a better data set, inclusion of a better proxy for v would 
eliminate the apparent impact of inequality. Perhaps the initial income distribution is related to 
policies that affect future growth. Controlling for such policies would provide a simple way to 
evaluate this possibility. 
The more feasible problem is addressed by finding a set of instruments,Z2vt1, that 
satisfies both Ev vt |Z2vt1,Xvt1 [] = 0  (uncorrelated with the time-varying error term), and 
E v |Z2vt1,Xvt1 [] = 0  (uncorrelated with potentially adverse, but less problematic, village fixed 
effects,  v ). One candidate set of instruments is based on the initial distribution of factor 
endowments. For historical reasons, it may be the case that land distribution is exogenous to 
measurement error (vvt ), and unobserved policies in existence in the village (v ). In this 
example, we require the land distribution to affect growth only through its effect on income 
inequality, with no independent effect on growth. The exclusion restriction fails if the land 
distribution is also correlated with v. It is plausible that we can use such variables as instruments 
to address some of the potential omitted variables problems (v ), but equally plausible that we 
can never rule out the potential existence of v. 
What is the specific nature of v that worries us? Suppose that v is a taste or 
predisposition for low inequality (egalitarian-oriented villages). This is of concern only if v is 
also related to growth, for example, if egalitarian villages are more likely to invest in schools (or 
other growth-enhancing public goods). From an interpretation standpoint, if this drives the 
inequality-growth relationship, then our conclusions will only be accurate from an “historical” Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 10 
perspective: unequal villages in our sample grew more slowly, and this initial inequality was 
causally related to growth (in a limited sense). However, if it is the underlying taste for inequality 
(v) that drives growth, then the Robin Hood “experiment” would not affect the growth 
trajectory. If we controlled for v, changing inequality would have no impact on growth. Rising 
inequality would be of no concern for growth, even if initial inequality mattered. So while we 
could confidently conclude that low inequality villages grew faster, if unobserved 
“egalitarianism” was the driving force, we could draw no conclusions from the current increase in 
rural inequality. Ideally, we would like to disentangle the impact of actual inequality from 
unobserved “tastes” for low inequality. 
One way to accomplish this is by employing village fixed effects, and using time-varying 
income growth and changes in inequality to identify causal links between inequality and growth. 
With that estimator, we can exploit time-varying information on village incomes from 1986 to 
1999, to determine whether the timing of changes in inequality line up with changes in growth. 
We conduct this exercise, but it is important to highlight the potential problems for which the 
fixed effects estimator is no panacea: 
•  Measurement Error.   Measurement error problems that plague levels may be worsened in the 
panel. For example, while the village Gini’s in a given year may be measured with noise, 
changes in inequality will be even noisier, leading to greater attenuation bias. To some extent, 
these problems can also be addressed by measurement-error-inspired instruments. But that 
doesn’t change the fact that there may be less information in the timing of changes in 
inequality and growth than we can obtain from the longer run cross section. 
•  Simultaneity. The panel-based fixed-effects estimator essentially estimates the relationship 
between growth and changes of inequality. The reverse relationship was the focus of Kuznets 
(1955) research (The “Kuznets curve”). Growth may affect inequality, in which case we may 
observe a positive relationship between the two variables, depending on the position along 
the Kuznets curve. To some extent, this can be addressed through instrumental variables, as 
well as independent investigation of the Kuznets relationship. 
•  Dynamic Issues. The fixed-effects specification entails estimation of a dynamic panel data 
model, with a lagged dependent variable (initial income). As noted by Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982), and Arellano and Bond (1991), this is subject to its own mis-specification. There are 
a variety of strategies one can employ to address problem. A simple one is to find instruments 
that help predict initial income, but which are independent of the error term. Instead of 
various lags of initial income, our measurement-error-inspired instruments have the positive Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 11 
side-benefit of addressing the Arellano and Bond problem. A more serious potential problem 
is the general mis-specification of dynamics. We do not really know how inequality affects 
growth (if it does at all). It may be that a true causal relationship exists and is reflected in the 
long-run relationship estimated by the OLS cross-section. However, fixed effects (or first-
differences) require that there be an instantaneous link between contemporaneous changes in 
inequality and growth. If this is not the case, then we may find no relationship between 
inequality and growth in the fixed effects specification – not because there is no long run 
relationship--but because there is no such relationship in the short run. Indeed, this is the 
argument used by Easterly (2005), among others, to dismiss the panel data evidence. In the 
end, it may be difficult to reconcile conflicting fixed effect and OLS evidence. 
 
4.0   Household and Village Characteristics 
4.1 The Data 
Our data come from annual household surveys conducted by the Survey Department of 
the Research Center on the Rural Economy (RCRE). Household-level surveys from 100 villages 
in nine provinces (Anhui, Gansu, Guangdong, Henan, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jilin, Shanxi and Sichuan) 
are matched with corresponding village-level data.
11 Sample sizes are between 30 and 130 
households per village. Originally planned as an annual longitudinal survey, by 1999 there was 
significant attrition of households, on the order of 30 percent. A “representative” household 
replaced each lost household. We are able to follow a subset of continuously surveyed households 
in 82 of the villages. To construct village-level variables, we use data from 1986 to 1999 that 
includes between 7,000 and 8,000 households per year.   
The survey collected detailed household-level information on incomes and expenditures, 
education, labor supply, asset ownership, land holdings, savings, formal and informal access to 
credit, and remittances. In common with the NBS Rural Household Survey, respondent 
households keep daily diaries of income and expenditure, and a resident administrator living in 
the county seat visits with households once a month to collect information from the diaries. The 
large number of households surveyed from each  village and the lengthy span of the survey 
enables us to track the evolution of consumption, incomes and inequality during a time of 
                                                 
11The complete RCRE survey covers over 22,000 households in 300 villages in 31 provinces and 
administrative regions.  RCRE’s complete national survey is 31 percent of the annual size of the NBS Rural 
Household Survey.  By agreement, we have obtained access to data from 9 provinces, or roughly one third 
of the RCRE survey.  Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 12 
changing market access and development in rural China. Of particular importance for our 
purposes, we are able to track a panel of villages, even where there has been household attrition.  
A variety of definitions are worth clarifying, though further details related to attrition and 
comparisons of the RCRE data source with other data from rural China can be found in the main 
text and extensive appendices of Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles (2005). First, household 
membership is defined on the basis of residency and registration.  Second, income is calculated as 
the sum of net income (gross revenue less current expenditures) from agriculture, farming 
sidelines (e.g. animal husbandry and livestock), family-run businesses, plus wage income, and 
transfers. We calculate the value of farm output that is not sold, and thus largely consumed (or 
stored) by the household, at market prices. Our measure of household income also ignores taxes 
and fees.  Finally, we deflate all income and expenditure data into 1986 prices using the NBS 
rural consumer price index for each province. 
 
4.2 Trends in Per Capita Income and Inequality 
Household-level descriptive statistics spanning the period from 1987 to 1999 are reported 
in Table 1.
12 Over this period, rural per capita incomes rose less than 2 percent per annum, 
modest compared to reported national GDP growth rates over the same period. In part, lower 
growth among rural households reflects the sharp drop in agricultural commodity prices which 
occurred after 1996, and its adverse effect on farm incomes. Farming was nearly universal (94 
percent in 1999), but between 1987 and 1999, households diversified into non-agricultural family 
businesses and wage employment. These two sources of income account for much of the 
observed income growth, and helped offset the decline in agricultural income.  Income from 
family business grew by an average of 4.8 percent per year, and increased as a share of total 
income from 16 to 23 percent. The share of income from wage employment, in both local and 
migrant labor markets, increased from 25 to 39 percent of income and grew by 5.4 percent per 
year over the period from 1987 to 1999. 
 Overall inequality increased by 16 percent, as the Gini coefficient rose from 0.32 to 0.37. 
The expansion in off-farm, non-agricultural opportunities, and decline in barriers to mobility 
reduced the role of regional, provincial, and village differences in generating inequality, but 
widened differences between households in the same village. Between 1987 and 1999, the 
                                                 
12  See Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles (2005) for a more detailed discussion of the data, including a 
comparison of the RCRE data with other data sources. Ravallion and Chen (1999, 2005) examine 
inequality and poverty trends in China using the National Bureau of Statistics household surveys. Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 13 
contribution of within-village inequality to overall inequality increased from 50 to 58 percent.  
Figure 1 provides the distribution for household average annual growth rates over the period.  
 
4.3 Village Level Variables 
  In our analyses of the growth-inequality relationship, we wish to reduce the influence of 
measurement error and high-frequency shocks to income. Accordingly, we construct three year 
averages of all variables for both household and village level analyses.
13 In Table 2, we observe 
considerable variation in the initial period (1986 to 1988) average income per capita, and in 
growth rates of income per capita between period 1 and period 4 (1997 to 1999). Contrary to the 
image of relative equality of incomes within villages in the 1980s, we find considerable variation 
in initial per capita income in Figure 2. Initial village inequality, on the other hand, ranges from a 
low of 0.11 to a high of nearly 0.46, with most of the support between 0.15 and 0.30.   
In our village-level regression models, we include average years of education per 
working-age adult as a control for average human capital. There is a significant gap of almost 1.7 
years’ education between “low” and “high” education villages (i.e., 4.7 versus 6.4 years of 
education for the first and third quartiles). Differences across villages in the stock of initial human 
capital may be driven by differences in local provision of elementary education and proximity to 
middle schools, or differences in the private returns to education. The initial structure of the local 
economy is also likely to have a considerable impact on village growth prospects, and thus we 
also include the average share of income over the three year period earned from agricultural crops 
(both cash crops and grain crops). Again, the inter-quartile range suggests considerable range in 
the importance of traditional agricultural activities for village incomes. 
 
4.4 Instrument Sets for Village Level Analyses 
Summary statistics for our potential instruments are shown in Table 2. The instruments 
are separated into two distinct groups: measurement-error-inspired instruments, and endowment-
based instruments. The instruments, which vary greatly across villages, are used to predict both 
initial average income per capita, as well as the Gini: 
•  Measurement Error-Inspired Instruments. The first set of instruments is inspired by efforts to 
control for classical measurement error that leads to attenuation bias, or to mechanical forms 
of endogeneity that arise if outliers in household income drive a correlation between growth 
                                                 
13 In Anhui province, eight villages were not added to the survey until 1987, and in Gansu, data from 1988 
was missing for one village. For these nine villages, the initial period is calculated using a two-year 
average. Our results are robust to dropping these nine villages. Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 14 
and inequality. Potential instruments for initial income per capita include consumption per 
capita, and average off-farm wage income per capita. In our estimation, we use average off-
farm wage income per capita, under the assumption that the most important source of 
measurement error for income per capita occurs in the valuation of income from home-
produced grain and agricultural commodities that are not marketed. Wage income per capita 
will be strongly correlated with income per capita, but not with errors in measurement from 
home production. For the Gini coefficient, potential instruments include the consumption-
based Gini, and other measures of dispersion (the ninety/ten and the seventy-five/twenty-five 
income ratios). These variables should be correlated with the income Gini coefficient, but 
uncorrelated with outliers of household income. In our analyses, we use the ninety/ten and 
seventy-five/twenty-five income ratios, especially for their robustness to outliers. Note that 
the underlying assumption with these instruments is that measurement error is the only 
problem generating a correlation between the Gini and the error term, and the validity of the 
instruments is predicated on this assumption. 
•  Endowment-Inspired-Instruments: Land. Measures of average land per capita, and its 
distribution within villages, offer promise of an exogenous (or at least, long pre-determined) 
measure of the distribution of endowments within villages.
14  With the implementation of the 
household responsibility system (HRS) and the return of land to family farm management, 
land was allocated by village leadership in a fairly egalitarian way.
15 However, there were 
limits on the degree of land redistribution. Land allocation was typically carried out at the 
level of a village sub-unit, the small group, which usually consisted of 25-30 households. 
Village-wide reallocations of land across small groups tended to be infrequent. As a result, 
differences in land between small groups generated exogenous land inequality within a 
village. These differences date back nearly twenty years when, in the aftermath of the Great 
Leap Famine, property rights to land and decisions on land management were decentralized 
to the production team, the Maoist-era name of the small group. The accumulated effects of 
differences in average household demographic change across small groups may have further 
widened these initial differences in endowments. Thus, one source of within village 
inequality in 1986 derives from inequality in the distribution of land across village small 
                                                 
14  The land distribution has been taken as “relatively” exogenous in several other papers, either as the 
primary measure of inequality in the growth regression (Alesina and Rodrik (1994), or as an instrument for 
income inequality (as in Lundberg and Squire (2003)).  
15  See Putterman (1993) for a more detailed discussion of institutional change during the reform process. Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 15 
groups.
16 Potential land-endowment based instruments for the income per capita Gini 
coefficient thus include the Gini for cultivated land per capita, and the coefficient of variation 
of household dependency ratios. Potential instruments for initial income per capita include 
cultivated land per capita, “other” land per capita and the village average household 
dependency ratio. The land-based instruments should be valid in addressing measurement 
error, under the assumption that measurement error is the only econometric issue. They will 
also serve as legitimate instruments for income inequality under more general conditions, 
insofar as land differences between households within a village are not generated by village 
growth potential, or are correlated with the “taste” for equality. Especially if most variation is 
generated by differences across small groups, this condition should be satisfied. Even if the 
land Gini is not a valid instrument, at the very least it gives us a distinct estimate of the 
impact of inequality on growth which can be compared to our other estimates. 
•  Endowment-Inspired-Instruments: Productive Assets. A third set of potential instruments, 
shown in Table 2, is inspired by productive asset endowments in the initial period. After 
controlling for average village human capital and industry structure, measures of initial assets 
and their distribution can identify differences in income and the distribution of income across 
villages. Potential instruments for income include productive assets, share of productive 
assets managed by the collective, and the average village dependency ratio. The first variable 
picks up the effect of past investment in productive activity, and the second picks up 
heterogeneity in village policy promoting productive activity, and in how villages decided to 
manage village assets with the implementation of the household responsibility system.
17 
Instruments for income inequality include the Gini of productive assets per capita gini, the 
share of assets managed by the village collective,  and the coefficient of variation of 
household dependency ratios. The impact of the asset distribution should map into the 
distribution of income per capita across households in the village. The share of productive 
assets managed by the collective, that could also be an instrument for income per capita, 
                                                 
16 Neither the RCRE survey data, nor any other data source that we are aware of include information on 
households’ small group membership over the period we examine. Small group membership, however, did 
not change over this period. In 2003, RCRE reported small group identifiers for households for the first 
time. To assess the contribution of small groups to land inequality, we first run a regression of household 
land per capita on village identifiers alone, and next run the same regression on small group identifiers. The 
R-squared for the village dummies alone was 0.503, while 0.616 when using small group dummies, and an 
LM test for whether small group effects add explanatory power over village effects is 310.67 with a p-value 
of 0.0000. The small group’s contribution to land inequality was probably much more important in 1986 
than in 2003 because of the gradual evolution of land-transfer rights since the early-1990s. 
17 In addition to deciding how to allocate land among households, villages also had to decide how to 
dispense of village productive assets, including small enterprises. In some cases, these were retained and 
managed by the village, and in other cases they were sold off, or allocated amongst households. Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 16 
identifies heterogeneity across villages in collective participation in the village economy. To 
the extent that the collective may invest in lumpy production assets used in agriculture, then 
they may raise the income of more farmers together and thus a higher share of collective 
ownership may be correlated with less inequality. Alternatively, if access to income from 
collective assets is distributed equitably, through equal reductions in local taxes and fees or 
through equitable access to employment opportunity in collective enterprises, then collective 
asset ownership may be correlated with lower inequality within villages. 
•  The “Fat” Instrument Set: Asset and Land-Plus Combined.  Our final instrument set 
combines the land and asset instruments described above, and includes additional land-based 
instruments reflecting both the productivity of village land, and the role of the collective in 
land management. Additional instruments for initial income, shown in Table 2, include other 
land (land used for livestock, fisheries, and forest production), the share of households with 
other land, and shares of arable and other land under collective management. Additional 
instruments for the distribution of income include: other land interacted with share of 
households with other land, and shares of arable and other land under collective management. 
The “Fat” set of instruments most likely pushes the limits of exogeneity, given the 
requirements that capital affect growth only through its effect on initial income (and its 
distribution). While they have limitations, over-identification tests should at least determine 
whether our various instrumenting strategies are internally consistent. 
 
5.0 Results 
Our first objective is to estimate, and establish the robustness of the empirical 
relationship between inequality and household income growth. 
 
5.1 The OLS Relationship 
In Table 3 we show the OLS estimates of equations 2 (household-level), and equation 3 
(village-level). Column 1 begins with the household-level estimates, and shows the main result of 
the paper: in villages with high inequality in the initial period (1986 through 1988), household 
incomes grew slower than those in villages with low inequality.
 18 This result is not an artifact of 
aggregation: the regression is estimated at the household level, and we control for household 
income linearly (in column 1), and non-linearly in column 2. These results also cast doubt on 
                                                 
18 Our household level regression employs cluster-corrected standard errors to account for the mixture of 
household- and village-level regressors.  Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 17 
simple credit-market explanations, by which the Gini reflects variation across households of the 
marginal product of capital.  
Some of the other coefficients bear comment, as their patterns are common to future 
specifications. First, household incomes demonstrate convergence over the sample period, with 
richer households’ incomes growing more slowly. Second, we observe an “external” effect of the 
level – not just inequality – of village income on household income growth: controlling for own-
household income, households in richer villages grew faster. Third, incomes grew slower in those 
villages with a higher initial share of income in agriculture. This reflects those villages’ greater 
exposure to the collapse of crop prices in the late 1990s, and the higher incomes that can be 
earned off-farm in villages with growing non-agricultural sectors. Finally, after controlling for 
own-household education, there remains a robust positive effect of average village education 
levels. This pattern persists in future tables, highlighting the important role of village-level 
education to the evolution of household incomes. One channel by which inequality could 
influence growth, is through higher initial investments in primary schools in more equal 
villages.
19 Note however, that the effect of inequality remains, even after controlling for 
education. 
While the household level regressions yield the main results of the paper, we conduct 
most of our empirical and econometric explorations at the village level. The household-level 
results suggest that the impact of inequality is a village-level phenomenon, and it is easier to 
explore correlates with inequality, and potential causal mechanisms, at the village level. Figure 3 
plots village-level growth against the village-level Gini. The OLS line has a slope of -0.063, with 
a statistically insignificant t-value of 1.42. While the 3 villages with the highest Gini’s could 
dominate the regression (and exaggerate the slope), the non-parametric (Lowess) plot is similar to 
the OLS line through most of the sample. The regression analogues to Figure 3, with full controls, 
are shown in the last four columns of Table 3. Column 3 shows the village-level results based 
only on the panel households (the same sample used in columns 1 and 2). The estimated effect of 
inequality is negative and statistically insignificant, as in Figure 3. In column 4, we use village 
means constructed from the entire sample of households, i.e., the panel, those lost to attrition, and 
their replacements. The results with this sample are basically the same as those based on the more 
restricted panel-based village data. As at the household-level, we observe village-level 
convergence of average incomes, a strong positive effect of the initial level of education, and a 
negative effect of concentration in agriculture. 
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We explore the potential importance of selective migration and panel attrition in columns 
5 and 6. In column 5 we add a control for the amount of out-migration from the village that 
occurred between 1986 and 1999, while in column 6 we add a variable summarizing the extent of 
attrition of households from the sample.
20 Neither of these controls is statistically significant, and 
the key results for the Gini are unaffected. In summary, our OLS results show a strong negative 
relationship between initial inequality and income growth at the household level, and a weaker 
negative result at the village level. This mirrors the pattern observed by Ravallion (1998) using 
the county as a unit of observation, and suggests that the village level regression may understate 
the impact of inequality on growth, possibly because of issues related to aggregation. 
 
5.2 Instrumental Variables Estimates 
  For reference, we reproduce the base village-level OLS results in the first column of 
Table 4. In the other columns, we vary the instrument set to address the econometric problems 
raised in section 3, treating the level (initial village income) and inequality (the Gini) as 
endogenous. We start by addressing measurement error, using our “measurement error-inspired” 
instrument set, the 90/10 and 75/25 income ratios, and average wage income per capita.
21 These 
instruments, essentially “re-packaged” functions of the distribution of household income, are 
highly significant in the first stage equations, and generate significantly negative estimates of the 
impact of inequality on growth. This suggests that the weak OLS estimates suffer from 
measurement error-induced attenuation bias. From another perspective, the results in column 2 
show that “inequality matters,” when we use a richer set of inequality measures than the Gini. 
The coefficient on initial village incomes, on the other hand, is similar to the OLS equation. 
  In columns 3 through 5, we use the different sets of endowment-based instruments 
introduced in Section 4. At a minimum, these instruments help address measurement error, and 
are better for this purpose than using functions of income, like the 90-10 ratio. They also address, 
in principle, some of the other potentially important endogeneity problems. In column 3 we use 
our “leanest” set of endowment measures, based on the distribution of land. This instrument set 
should break possible mechanical links between initial income and its subsequent growth rate. 
Furthermore, if the land distribution is uncorrelated with those unobserved factors linking 
inequality to growth (v), then we can interpret the result as the “causal” effect of inequality on 
growth: If land inequality is an “accident of history,” then its effect on subsequent growth occurs 
                                                 
20 We used the average share of households attritting per year from 1986 to 1999.  
21 Wage income is probably subject to less from measurement error than crop income, for which farm 
households need to estimate the value of non-marketed agricultural produce that is consumed or stored. Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 19 
entirely through its impact on initial income inequality.
22 As a start, the instruments pass the usual 
specification tests for being minimally acceptable: they are significant predictors in the first stage 
equations, and they pass conventional over-identification tests. The 2SLS results based on these 
instruments show a larger adverse effect of inequality, with a coefficient on the Gini of -0.23.  
This implies, for example, that an increase in the Gini from 0.20 to 0.30 reduces growth by 2.3 
percent. The fact that the coefficient on inequality is larger than with our “measurement inspired” 
instruments (Column 2) is consistent with the presence of residual measurement error in the 
income-based instrument set. 
  We gain further interpretation by examining the reduced form that underlies the 2SLS 
results. The first columns of Table 5 show the reduced form associated with “lean land 
instruments” for each endogenous variable: initial village income, the initial level of inequality, 
and subsequent income growth. The underlying “experiment” we wish to exploit is illustrated in 
columns 2 and 3. First, initial land inequality is significantly related to initial income inequality. 
Second, we see in column 3 that villages with higher land inequality grew significantly slower. 
Our structural interpretation (via 2SLS) is that the entire effect of land inequality is through its 
impact on the income inequality, which in turn reduces growth, by whatever mechanism or 
channel. 
  Returning to Table 4, Column 4, we use capital, instead of land-based, assets as 
instruments. This instrument set addresses measurement error without many strong assumptions, 
but requires strong assumptions to address some of the other issues. Despite being distinct from 
the land distribution, the asset-based instruments yield an almost identical estimate of the effect 
of inequality on growth. In column 5, we use the “fat” instrument set, combining the land and 
capital instruments, and generating a similar, but more precisely estimated, negative coefficient 
on initial inequality. The reduced form for the “fat” instruments is shown in the last three 
columns of Table 5. In column 8, the first stage for the Gini, only the land Gini is individually 
significant among the instruments, though the joint F-statistic indicates that, jointly, the excluded 
instruments are significant predictors of initial inequality. While only significant at the 10 percent 
level, note the coefficient on the share of assets managed by the collective (village): in villages 
where the local government owns more of the local assets, initial income inequality is lower. The 
corresponding effect of this variable on growth is positive but insignificant. This is admittedly 
weak evidence linking “institutions” to growth, but if this variable reflects a village taste for 
“collective ownership” or coordination, it lines up with both lower initial inequality and higher 
                                                 
22 Recall that the “accident” that we believe is relevant are differences in land endowments across village 
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subsequent growth. Through the lens of the 2SLS framework, if this taste is exogenous to the 
growth equation, we can view it as a potentially exogenous shifter of initial income inequality, 
leading to a different growth trajectory.
23 On the other hand, the importance of collective 
ownership may reflect unobserved heterogeneity (v), in which case the above interpretation is 
wrong: it is v that drives growth, not initial income inequality. In order to address this 
possibility, we need to move beyond instrumental variables, and exploit the panel dimension of 
the village data. To this point, our intermediate conclusion is there is evidence linking initial 
inequality to subsequent growth of household income, which is neither an artifact of aggregation 
or measurement error. 
 
5.3 Panel Data Results 
The simplest way to control for v, and its potential confounding of the correlation 
between income, land, and asset inequality, is through the Fixed Effect (FE) specification. 
However, it is also worth interpreting the panel results through the first difference (FD) estimator: 
 
lnyvt =  1lnyvt1 + 2Xvt1 +vGvt1 +vt      ( 5 )  
 
This transformation of equation (4) underscores the re-framing of the question entailed by 
moving to the panel: If the level of inequality is bad for growth, then increases of inequality 
should also reduce subsequent growth, mediated by the samev. The FD specification purges 
Gvt1 and lnyvt  of any correlation driven by initial village conditions and their long run growth 
path. Even if most of the linkage is at long-run frequencies, we should obtain the same estimates 
of v as long as equation (3) is correct. 
We construct a panel version of the cross-section data, comprised of four time periods, 
taking three-year village averages of the underlying annual data.
24 This step is especially 
important in the panel, as FE estimation will highlight high frequency variation in the data that 
may be dominated by noise (especially measurement error). Measured inequality, for example, 
might fluctuate around a slow moving trend, either because of genuine variation, or year-to-year 
measurement error. Three-year averages dampen some of the non-genuine changes in variables 
like the Gini. As we saw in the cross-section, measurement error reduces the empirical links 
                                                 
23 As we discuss later, this result is not due to the presence of township and village enterprises (TVEs). 
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between inequality and growth, and we require similar IV strategies to address measurement error 
in the panel. 
  The panel results are presented in Table 6. There are four “packages” of estimates: No 
instruments (“OLS”), and three instrumental variables (2SLS) versions with similar instrument 
sets to those used in Table 4 (measurement error-inspired; “lean” land; and “fat”). The 2SLS 
estimators serve two purposes: first, they help address measurement errors, and second, they deal 
with the potential correlation between the lagged dependent variable (in this case, lagged income) 
and the FE or FD error term.
25 For each “package,” we report the FE results for a balanced panel 
of villages, with the Random Effects (RE) results only reported for the “OLS” package. 
  Across all specifications, there is one robust finding: Changes of inequality do not affect 
the growth trajectory of a village.
26 Furthermore, because we use measurement-error robust 
instruments in columns (4) to (9), we are confident that the insignificance is not an artifact of 
measurement error. The specification test in the “OLS” package suggests that the RE estimator is 
rejected in favour of the FE estimator – though the coefficients on the Gini are essentially the 
same. Testing between the OLS-FE and various 2SLS specifications, there is no evidence against 
the null hypothesis that OLS-FE is the preferred specificaton. In any event, we obtain the same 
answer in all specifications: there is no evidence of link between inequality and growth once we 
control for the unobserved v. 
  A potential explanation for this finding is simultaneity bias, whereby the dominant link 
between the two variables is causality running from growth to inequality: as villages grow, 
inequality rises as a by-product of development (e.g., Kuznets (1955); Anand and Kanbur (1993); 
Lundberg and Squire (2003)). Our IV strategy should mitigate this possibility, insofar as rising 
land inequality is not driven by growth. To explore the possibility, we estimated reverse-variants 
of the growth regressions to see whether there was any evidence of a Kuznets-like process. We do 
not show them, but our results mimic those reported in Table 6: we found no evidence of an 
empirical link between growth and inequality in the panel.
27 
  Do the panel results imply that inequality doesn’t matter, and that the cross-section 
results are spurious? No. They imply that whatever factor is at play, whether the unobservable, 
v, or genuine differences in a variable highly correlated with it, e.g., inequality, the inequality-
                                                 
25  See Arellano and Bond (1991); Anderson and Hsiao (1982) 
26  The elimination, or the attenuation, of the cross-section inequality-growth relationship in the panel 
specification is a common finding. For example, see Barro (2000), Forbes (2000), and Panizza (2003). 
27  Another possibility, noted by Banerjee and Duflo (2003) in their evaluation of Forbes (2000), is a non-
linear (quadratic) effect of changes in inequality on subsequent growth. We also explored this possibility, 
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growth relationship holds only in the low frequency, long run data. The panel does, however, 
provide some insight on the nature of these connections. As with the household-level data, it 
points away from a simple capital or credit-market based story. With this class of explanations, 
we would expect that inequality mattered in the short run. Instead, our results further point to an 
institutionally-oriented explanation. Whether the unobserved institutions are caused by, or just 
correlated with v, is unresolved. A second implication of our findings is that whatever legitimate 
concerns may exist over rising inequality in China, there is no evidence in our data to suggest that 
rising inequality “chokes” growth. 
 
6.0 Exploring the Nature of Gv,t1 (orv) 
 Whether  it  isGv,t1, or the highly correlated v, that is negatively related to long run 
growth, what more can we learn about the channels by which the village income distribution 
affects household income growth? We now turn to a series of explorations that may inform us 
about other patterns linking inequality (or v) to growth. An organizing question is which class of 
explanations – credit-market or public goods –  is most likely behind v. 
 
6.1 Inequality and Economic Structure 
  To start, we explore the relationship between inequality and other indicators of 
“economic development.” Specifically, in Table 7 we disaggregate household income to see 
which income components are most adversely affected by inequality. The regressions are slight 









Type     ( 6 )  
 
The principal difference is that we control for initial income of the particular type, lnyvt1
Type . 
Inequality is still measured by the Gini for total income. We estimate the regressions by OLS and 
2SLS, employing the same sets of instruments (“lean land,” and “extended”), and the same 
controls (i.e., province fixed effects and other location-specific variables). 
  In the first two pairs of columns we break income into “Agricultural” (Crop) and “Non-
agricultural” components. One way that inequality could affect economic growth is through credit 
market imperfections. For example, if retained earnings are the only way to finance investment in 
family businesses or off-farm activity, and assuming that there are minimum thresholds for such Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 23 
investments, then for a given level of average income we would expect greater investment (and 
thus growth) in more equal villages. Column (1) shows the OLS estimates for agricultural 
income, and in column (2) we report estimates for non-agricultural income. The contrast is fairly 
stark: Inequality is positively (but insignificantly) related to agricultural growth; however, non-
farm income growth is negatively related to initial inequality. This suggests that inequality affects 
growth through its effect on the composition of economic activity, and the ability of households 
to move into more rapidly growing sources of income. Interestingly, low inequality has a similar 
effect to higher education: Higher initial education is strongly correlated with non-agricultural 
development. 
  In the next two columns we disaggregate non-agricultural income into two main 
components: (1) Wage income (including wage income for household members working outside 
the village); and (2) Family-run business income. Statistically, the effect of inequality seems 
stronger for wage income than family businesses. Given the important role of education in 
accessing off-farm jobs (as is clear in column 3), this result suggests that the “public good,” or an 
education-based explanation may link inequality to growth. Credit may yet be necessary for 
households to finance off-farm employment (including migration) through “retained earnings.” 
However, if credit were the key consideration, inequality should matter more in the family-run 
business equation. 
  Columns (5) through (12) repeat the analysis using instrumental variables for initial 
income and inequality (using the same instrument sets). As in previous tables, the 2SLS 
estimators satisfy the conventional specification tests concerning the fit of the first stage, and 
over-identification tests. They also yield results similar to OLS: Lower inequality in 1986 is 
correlated with greater village economic development outside agriculture, especially for wage 
income. 
 
6.2 The role of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) 
  One possible institutional explanation, and candidate v, is that the low-inequality 
villages had better developed non-farm sectors at the beginning, and in particular, had 
collectively-owned township and village enterprises that either flourished themselves, or fostered 
the growth of a complementary non-farm sector. We noted in Table 5, that in the reduced form 
inequality and growth equations, village ownership of assets was negatively correlated with 
inequality, and weakly positively correlated with subsequent growth. Perhaps these assets reflect 
the beneficial impact of TVEs. Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 24 
  To more precisely evaluate this possibility, we gleaned village-level information on the 
presence of TVEs. There is no perfect measure of the extent of TVEs at the beginning of the 
sample; however, we use the 1993 survey to measure the existence of the TVEs in 1993. To 
capture the first order cross-village variation in TVEs, we construct a TVE variable equal to the 
number of TVEs. Table 8 reports results of our standard village-level regressions, including the 
TVE variable. We report the results for the level and composition of income (i.e., agricultural and 
non-agricultural). As before, we report OLS and 2SLS specifications, using the lean land, and 
“fat” instrument sets. The “fat” instrument set includes the village collective asset variable, so we 
also report the impact of including TVEs on the significance of this variable in the reduced form. 
The short summary of our results is that controls for the number of TVEs have no impact on our 
previous conclusions. If TVEs – or even the propensity to have them – were correlated with the 
unobservable v, we would expect a reduction in coefficients on the Gini. But inequality remains 
just as important a predictor of growth and development, while the TVE variables are themselves 
statistically insignificant. The coefficient signs are what we might expect: TVEs are positively, 
though insignificantly, related to growth of incomes, especially non-farm incomes. Finally, the 
TVE measures do not diminish the importance of the “share of assets owned by the collective” in 
the reduced form equation for the Gini. TVEs do not appear to be an important part of the story. 
 
6.3 Does Inequality Hurt the Poor More than the Rich? 
  Are the rich immune to the deleterious effect of high inequality? If a household is rich in 
a high inequality village, it may be less adversely affected by imperfect credit markets – and may 
even have an advantage. On the other hand, if the inequality-growth mechanism is primarily 
related to public goods (like schools) there may be no reason to expect a differential distribution 
of the benefits of low inequality. Perhaps the poor will benefit more from public goods? To 
address this question we return to the household-level specification, adding an interaction term 
between initial household income and the initial level of inequality. If the poor are hurt more by 
high inequality, we expect the interaction effect to be positive, with higher incomes mitigating the 
the adverse impact of inequality. Results of this exercise are presented in Table 9. 
  In column 1 we reproduce the basic OLS household level specification (identical to Table 
3, Column 1), showing the overall negative impact of inequality. The interaction effect is added 
in Column (2), and is negative, but statistically insignificant. The negative sign is consistent with 
the rich being most adversely affected by inequality (not the poor). The sign, however, is less 
notable than the insignificance of the coefficient. Measurement error is a probably a greater 
possibility at the household level, especially given the key variable is the interaction between Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 25 
initial household income and the village Gini. For this reason we reproduce the exercise using an 
expanded set of instruments that includes the original village-level “lean land” and “extended” 
instruments, adding household-level instruments (based on wage income, and income from 
family businesses). This is a tall order for the IV exercise. The specification tests suggest we do a 
reasonable job in the first stage regressions, though less well in satisfying the overidentification 
restrictions (which are rejected). That said, the 2SLS results are similar to OLS: there appears to 
be no significant interaction between initial household income and the level of inequality in the 
village. To the extent that we expect such a relationship when contemporaneous credit shortages 
are a concern, this evidence also points towards the class of explanations based on local public 
goods (or taxes). 
 
6.4 Other Measures of Public Expenditure and Taxation 
  The “public good” class of explanations suggests that lower inequality leads to collective 
choices that are better for long run growth. The mechanism might be lower or less punitive 
(redistributive) taxes, or the collective decision to invest in public goods or higher education that 
benefits most villagers. The RCRE data has a limited number of “public finance” and collective 
choice variables that we can investigate. None of these variables turns out to be the elusive v, 
whose inclusion in our growth regression “explains away” the impact of inequality on growth. 
However, to the extent that our evidence points towards this class of explanations, it would be 
more convincing to find some of the observable channels by which inequality affects village 
governance. So far, we have highlighted the potential role of education, insofar as low inequality 
has a similar effect on growth as higher education. But education itself is unlikely the only factor, 
since we already control for education in the growth regression, and inequality is highly 
significant. Furthermore, as we saw in the reduced form reported in Table 5, education is 
insignificantly correlated with the village Gini. Unobserved school quality is one candidate for 
the important village investment that behaves like the quantity of education, without being fully 
controlled by the level.
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28  Fan, Zhang, and Zhang (2004) catalogue other potential provincial-level public investments that are 
correlated with growth and poverty reduction in rural China, including: agricultural R and D; irrigation; 
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  Our explorations are restricted to the limited set of observables in the RCRE surveys. We 
constructed a variety of public finance variables from both the taxation and expenditure side of 
the village books. Our base regression is a variant of our cross-section growth equation: 
 
vt1 =  0 + 1lnyvt1 + 2Xvt1 + 3Gvt1 +uvt     ( 7 )  
where  vt1 is a measure of public finances at the beginning of the sample period. We focus on 
whether there are observable choices made by village governments that are correlated with initial 
inequality, i.e., we are interested in  3 for the various public finance measures. A separate, and 
more difficult, question is whether these choices ultimately help or hinder growth. 
  Tables 10 and 11 report representative findings from these explorations. For each 
dependent variable, we show the OLS and 2SLS coefficients, employing the same instruments as 
in other exercises. The public finance variables we present are listed below, with details provided 
in the Appendix (Section 8.0): 
•  Village Revenue per Capita (log): Do more equal villages establish a tax regime that permits 
the collection of greater tax revenues that can be used to support public investments? Village 
revenue includes income from collectively owned assets, like TVEs. 
•  Village Expenditure per Capita (log): Do more equal villages spend more, presumably in the 
provision of public goods that may enhance growth? 
•  Village Taxes and Fees per capita: This is similar to the village revenue measure, except that 
it only includes taxes and fees. 
•  Village Average Tax Rate: Do more equal villages adopt lower, and less punitive tax rates, 
that could encourage growth? 
•  Progressivity of village taxes: Do more equal villages set “fairer” taxes? We measure tax 
progressivity as the ratio of the (actual) tax rate of the richest 25% of villagers to the poorest 
25% of villages. In more “progressive” villages, this ratio should be higher. 
   In the first panel of Table 10, we show results for village revenue. Not surprisingly, we 
find that revenue per capita is higher in richer villages, and lower in villages that are most 
engaged in farming. While we find that high inequality villages have less revenue per capita, in 
accordance with expectations that low inequality may be related to a greater ability to collect tax 
revenue from a broad base, the coefficient is statistically insignificant. In the last three columns of 
Table 10, we show the coefficients for expenditure per capita. Not surprisingly, these results 
mirror those for revenue; in particular, there is no statistically significant link between initial 
inequality and the overall level of public spending or taxation (though the sign is “correct”). In Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 27 
the first three columns of Table 11, we break out the tax and fee components of village revenue. 
Once non-tax revenue is subtracted from total revenue, we observe that taxes are actually higher 
in more agricultural villages. They are also slightly higher in more unequal villages, though the 
result is insignificant. These results thus suggest that there is no empirical link between initial 
inequality and the “tax base” of villages. 
  In the last two sets of specifications we explore the links between inequality and tax 
rates. In columns (4) through (6) we see weak evidence that tax rates are higher in more unequal 
villages. Richer villages also have lower tax rates, while villages with a greater share of activity 
in farming also have higher average taxes. The only statistically significant link between 
inequality and the public finance variables occurs with the degree of tax progressivity in the 
village. When we use measurement error-inspired instruments (column 8), we find that higher 
inequality is associated with a lower degree of progressivity (i.e., flatter taxes), a finding similar 
to that of Sokoloff and Zolt (2005). Taken at face value, this suggests that in villages where there 
is lower inequality, or possibly greater social cohesion, taxes are more progressive: higher income 
households pay a larger share of income in taxes. It isn’t clear that this tax rate would then feed 
into growth, with progressive taxes fostering growth. Instead, it may be a separate indicator that 
low inequality villages are more egalitarian in their selection of policies, including tax policy. 
These egalitarian policies, insofar as they may also lead to greater investment in public goods 
such as schools, may contribute to growth. It is not clear whether progressive taxes are just 
another reflection of the egalitarian streak (v), or whether they, too, are caused by low initial 
inequality. It is also unclear whether or not more progressive taxes are correlated with growth 
enhancing policies. But ignoring the standard errors, our results suggest that high inequality is 
associated with higher overall tax rates, with more of the tax burden falling on low and middle 
income villagers. It isn’t difficult to imagine scenarios by which this hurts growth. As a final 
note, we explored several other public finance variables besides the ones reported here: they 
yielded the same basic pattern of insignificance.  
 
7.0 Conclusions 
  Is the trajectory of household income growth adversely affected by the level of inequality 
in the village in which it lives? The leading explanations that have been proposed for an 
economy-wide linkage between inequality and growth – poorly developed factor markets, lower 
provision of public goods, or growth-inhibiting forms of taxation – may operate in principle at the 
village-level in rural China. In rural China, especially from the beginning of economic reforms, 
local governments, their policies, and local economic conditions were important dimensions of Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 28 
the economic environment in which households developed.  Using a rich household-level data set 
stratified by village, we estimate the empirical links between the level of inequality near the 
beginning of reforms (1986) and the growth of household incomes in the village through 1999. 
Whether we use the sample of households that can be tracked all the way through the panel, or 
treat the villages as distinct cross-sections, we find robust evidence that initial inequality is 
significantly related to subsequent growth: Inequality “hurts” growth. Because we can estimate 
the relationship at the household level, and given a rich set of instruments that can be used to 
address measurement error, we are able to rule out a number of explanations. In particular, we 
can rule out the possibility that the relationship is an artifact of aggregation, measurement error, 
or other mechanical explanations based on non-linearities linking initial household income to 
growth. Furthermore, since we control for own resources in the household-level specification, we 
cast doubt on the imperfect credit-market class of explanations. In short, we find robust evidence 
that high village inequality exerts a negative “externality” on household economic growth. 
  We cannot rule out, however, that there is an unobserved “third” factor that is correlated 
with both initial inequality and subsequent growth. Indeed, when we employ a village fixed-
effects specification to address this concern, the link between inequality and growth vanishes. 
However, it is also possible that the short-run links between inequality and growth are weak, and 
that whatever process drives growth, operates at longer run frequencies in the data. The village 
fixed-effects estimator would likely discard this important (and only) part of the relationship 
between inequality and growth.  
To better understand why high inequality might hurt growth, we explore the other aspects 
of the growth experience of the village, and potential linkages to various initial conditions, 
especially in terms of public finance (revenue and expenditure). First, we find that the primary 
nature of the growth-inequality linkage operates through the composition of economic activity: 
low inequality seems to enhance growth in non-farm incomes, and tilts the village away from 
agriculture. Second, we find weak support for the influence of inequality through local political 
economy channels: Higher inequality is associated with higher overall tax rates; more regressive 
taxes; and lower levels of revenue and expenditures.  These patterns are consistent with low 
inequality leading to greater investments in growth-enhancing public goods or the setting of 
“fairer” taxes that also foster growth, echoing the recent suggestions of Sokoloff and Zolt (2005). 
Even without fully understanding the mechanism, which remains unobserved, it appears that 
whether it is genuinely exogenous higher inequality, or an unobservable factor that is correlated 
with it, villages with higher inequality grow significantly more slowly.  Inequality and growth in rural China, Page 29 
8.0 Appendix: Definitions of Public Finance Variables 
1.  Village Revenue Per Capita: the weighted average revenue per capita from the village for the 
1986 to 1988 period and calculated from the village survey. We first calculate the three-year 
sum of village revenue in 1986 Yuan RMB, and then divide by the three year sum of village 
population. In our estimation, we use the log of this value. 
2.  Village Expenditure Per Capita: the weighted average expenditure per capita from the village 
for the 1986 to 1988 period and calculated from the village survey. We first calculate the 
three-year sum of village expenditure in 1986 Yuan RMB, and then divide by the three year 
sum of village population. In our estimation, we use the log of this value. 
3.  Village Taxes and Fees per Capita: We calculate this in the same manner as village revenue 
per capita. It is calculated from the village survey, but excludes revenues from TVEs, other 
revenues and an unobserved residual. 
4.  Village Average Tax Rate: the weighted average tax rate faced by households in the village. 
We first add the taxes and fees paid over the three-year period for all households enumerated 
in the household survey, and then we divide by total income earned by these households over 
the three-year period. 
5.  Progressivity of village taxes: using the method in (4) above, we calculate the three-year 
weighted average tax rate faced by richest quartile of households and divide by the three-year 
weighted average tax rate faced by the poorest quartile. An increase in this index reflects an 
increase in tax progressivity. 
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Household-Level Descriptive Statistics 
The Composition of Income in 1987 Compared to 1999 
(in 1986 RMB) 
 
  1987 1999  Growth 
  Mean  Share  % > 0  Mean  Share  % > 0   
Total Income  578 1.000  1.000 714 1.000  0.999  0.018 
Agricultural Income  229 0.397  0.981 158 0.222  0.942  -0.031 
Agricultural Sidelines  74 0.129  0.955 68 0.095  0.764  -0.007 
Family Businesses  91 0.157  0.616  162  0.227  0.501  0.048 
Wage Income  145 0.251  0.711 276 0.387  0.680  0.054 
Family Transfers  29 0.050  0.525 34 0.048  0.495  0.016 
Government Transfers  4 0.008  0.651 6 0.008  0.708  0.022 
Other Income  5 0.009  0.138 8 0.012  0.110  0.040 
         
    1987     1999    
Inequality         
Gini Coefficient   0.32    0.37   0.156 
Spatial Dimension of 
Inequality         
Contribution of Region   0.186    0.120    
Contribution of Province   0.237    0.153    
Contribution of Village   0.500    0.424    
               
Sample Size   7983    6987    
Notes: This table compares the composition of income in 1987 to 1999. Real per capita income is shown for detailed sub-
categories of income, along with the share of income (“Share”) accounted for, and the proportion of households with non-zero 
income for that source. The last column reports the implied annual growth rate of income for that source. Note that wage income 
is divided between “Local” wage income, “Temporary Migrant” and employment in the local government. Temporary migrant 
employment includes both commuters returning home on weekends and longer-term temporary migrants, and in most cases 
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Table 2 
Summary of Village Characteristics at Start of Period 
 
 
Village Averages for the Initial Period  
(1986-87-88) 
 25
th Median 75th 
Income     
Income Per Capita  340  496  636 
Growth Rate of Per Capita Income (Period 1 to 4)  0.001  0.027  0.049 
Gini (Income Per Capita)  0.190  0.219  0.266 
 Gini (Income Per Capita) from Period 1 to 4  -0.002  0.041  0.076 
      
Covariates     
Education (Years Per Adult)  4.679  5.779  6.411 
Crop Income Share  0.354  0.475  0.606 
      
Potential Instruments     
Consumption Per Capita  299  398  485 
Growth Rate of Per Capita Consumption (Period 1 to 4)  0.002  0.022  0.037 
Gini (Consumption Per Capita  0.148  0.168  0.183 
 Gini (Consumption Per Capita) from Period 1 to 4  0.014  0.033  0.062 
Ln(Average Off-Farm Wage Income)  3.658  4.248  4.766 
Ninety /Ten Income Ratio  2.329  2.707  3.239 
Seventy-Five/Twenty-Five Income Ratio  1.499  1.517  1.538 
Crop Land Per Capita  0.924  1.283  2.074 
Other Land Per Capita  0.081  0.364  3.068 
Village Average Dependency Rate  0.403  0.435  0.473 
Gini (Cultivated Land Per Capita)  0.140  0.171  0.210 
Coefficient of Variation of Household Dependency Rates  0.362  0.434  0.498 
Ln(Household Per Capita Productive Assets)  5.036  5.554  6.198 
Proportion of Assets Owned by Collective  0.101  0.249  0.415 
Gini (Household Productive Asset Per Capita)  0.387  0.506  0.641 
Share of HH with Other Land  0.016  0.094  0.683 
(Other Land PC)*(Share of HH with Other Land)  0.001  0.027  1.137 
Share of Crop Land Managed by Collective  0.000  0.000  0.025 
Share of Other Land Managed by Collective  0.200  0.614  1.000 
Village Location  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
 
Village Near a City   0.053  0.224   
Village in the Hills  0.377  0.486   
Village in the Mountains  0.243  0.432   
      
Notes:  These are village level summary statistics for the 100 villages used in our analyses.  We present 
information on the initial 1986 to 1988 base period used in our cross-section analyses. 
  




The Correlation Between Local Inequality and Subsequent Growth 
at the Household and Village Level 
                       
  
 
Dependent Variable:   
 ln(hh inc pc)   
Dependent Variable:                     
 ln(village avg inc pc) 














                -0.102*  -0.112*    -0.071 -0.071 -0.065 -0.068  Gini (Income Per Capita) 
(0.045) (0.046)    (0.055) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) 
               
0.021*  0.019*  -0.046* -0.048* -0.048* -0.048*  ln(Village Average Income 
Per Capita)  (0.007) (0.007)    (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
               
-0.075*  -0.554*    - - - -  ln(Household Income Per 
Capita)  (0.003)  (0.154)    - - - - 
               
-  0.075*    - - - -  (ln(HH Income Per 
Capita))^2  -  (0.027)    - - - - 
               
-  -0.004*    - - - -  (ln(HH Income Per 
Capita))^3  -  (0.002)    - - - - 
               
0.044* 0.045*    0.046* 0.051* 0.050* 0.051*  ln(Village Average 
Education Per Capita)  (0.014) (0.014)    (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
           
-0.024 -0.022    -0.026 -0.033  -0.032*  -0.034*  Share of Village Income 
From Agriculture  (0.015) (0.015)    (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
               
- -    - -  0.020  -  Average Village Migration 
Rate (1986-1999)  - -    - -  (0.046)  - 
               
- -    - - -  -0.050  Household Attrition Rate 
(1986-1999)  - -    - - -  (0.100) 
               
            N   4434  4434    86  100  100  100 
           r2   0.4432  0.447     0.5801  0.5817  0.5826  0.5829 
Notes:  Household controls (not shown) in Models 1 and 2 include ln(HH average education per capita), 
household size, household dependency ratio, male share of working age adults, household cultivated land per 
capita, ln(value of household assets per capita.  Models 1 and 2 are household level regressions using only 
households in the panel for the 1987 to 1999 period.  Models 3 through 6 are estimated at the village level.  Model 
3 uses only panel households, and Model 4 uses all available households in the village Model 5 tests the 
sensitivity of the relationship to average share of village participating in migrant labor markets over the period, 
and Model 6 includes the village average household attrition rate to examine the possibility that the relationship is 
biased by attrition. All models include province dummy variables and three location dummy variables: for 
whether the village is near a city, in the mountains, or in the hills.  Robust, cluster corrected standard errors in 
parentheses.  An asterisk (*) indicates a p-value of less than five percent. 
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Table 4 
The Cross-Sectional Relationship Between Growth and Inequality 
Results Using Different Instrument Sets 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   OLS  IV  IV  IV  IV 
            Gini (Income Per Capita)  -0.0709  -0.1310*  -0.2343*  -0.2558  -0.2509* 
  (0.0445) (0.0523) (0.1067) (0.1503) (0.0751) 
            Ln(Village Income Per Capita)  -0.0480*  -0.0401*  -0.0430*  -0.0329  -0.0393* 
  (0.0073) (0.0123) (0.0173) (0.0183) (0.0115) 
  Ln(Village  Average  Ed  Per  Capita)  0.0508* 0.0456* 0.0430* 0.0382* 0.0409* 
  (0.0123) (0.0119) (0.0142) (0.0176) (0.0138) 
            -0.0330* -0.0393 -0.0560*  -0.0555*  -0.0572*  Agricultural Income as a Share of Total 
Income  (0.0165) (0.0202) (0.0267) (0.0280) (0.0214) 
            Over-Identification       
     Chi-Square Statistic    0.84  3.35  0.04  4.46 
     Chi-Probability    0.360  0.341  0.833  0.924 
            The  First  Stage       
     Ln(Vill IPC)    F-Test    10.06  3.88  6.58  3.57 
                             F-Probability    0.000  0.003  0.001  0.000 
                 IPC Gini          F-Test    104.32  3.07  4.43  2.48 
                             F-Probability    0.000  0.014  0.006  0.009 
            N  100 100 100 100 100 
R2  0.5649  -- -- -- -- 
                 
In models 2 through 5, ln(Village Income Per Capita) and the Gini (Income Per Capita) are treated as 
endogenous.  We use the following instrument sets: 
Model 2: Instruments for Measurement Error: Ninety/ten income per capita ratio, seventy-five/twenty-five 
income per capita ratio, ln(average wage income per capita). 
Model 3:  Lean Land Instruments (The Lean Set): Cultivated land gini, cultivated land per capita, other land per 
capita, village average dependency ratio, coefficient of variation of household dependency ratios. 
Model 4:  Asset Instruments: Ln(Productive Assets Per Capita), Productive Asset Per Capita Gini, Share of 
Village Assets Controlled by Collective. 
Model 5: Extended Land Instruments and Asset Instruments (The Fat Set): Model 3 and 4 instruments, plus 
percent of hh other land (forest or fishpond land), percent with other land interacted with other land per capita, 
share of cultivated land managed by collective, and share of other land managed by the collective. 
Notes:  All models also include statistically significant province dummy variables and three village location 
dummy variables (near city, in hills, in mountains).  Robust standard errors in parentheses. An asterisk (*) 
indicates a p-value of less than five percent. 
 Table 5 
Correlates of Initial Income, Inequality and Village Income Growth 
The Reduced Form 
                                      Lean Land Instruments    Asset Instruments    Fat Instrument Set 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6)     (7)  (8)  (9) 
Variable ln(y1) G(y1)  ln(y)     ln(y1) G(y1)  ln(y)     ln(y1) G(y1)  ln(y) 
                        0.306 -0.021  0.029*    0.193 -0.018  0.034*    0.140 -0.003 0.028  Log Village Average Education Per 
Capita  (0.198) (0.027) (0.015)  (0.204) (0.029) (0.015)  (0.206) (0.029) (0.017) 
                        -0.393 -0.158* -0.006  -0.090 -0.134* -0.017  -0.104 -0.181* -0.016  Share of Income From Agriculture 
(0.242) (0.043) (0.022)  (0.246) (0.040) (0.023)  (0.286) (0.049) (0.026) 
                        1.480*  0.273*  -0.151*    - - -    1.331  0.243*  -0.123  Arable Land Per Capita Gini 
(0.731) (0.093) (0.069)   -  -  -   (0.715) (0.103) (0.072) 
                        0.019  0.014*  -0.002    - - -    -0.023  0.014  0.000  Arable Land Per Capita 
(0.045) (0.004) (0.003)   -  -  -   (0.041) (0.005) (0.003) 
                        Other Land Per Capita  -0.010*  0.000  0.000    -  -  -    -0.009  0.002  0.000 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)   -  -  -   (0.012) (0.002) (0.001) 
                        - - -    - - -    -0.217  -0.006  0.018  Share of HH with Other Land 
- - -    - - -    (0.119)  (0.025)  (0.012) 
                        - - -    - - -    0.003  -0.002  0.000  (Other LPC)*(Share of HH w/Other 
LPC)  - - -    - - -    (0.016)  (0.003)  (0.001) 
                        - - -    - - -    0.163  -0.039  0.005  Arable Land Under Collective 
Management as a Share of Total Land  -  -  -    -  -  -    (0.134)  (0.025)  (0.011) 
                        - - -    - - -    -0.066  -0.005  0.004  Other Land Under Collective 
Management as a Share of Total Land  -  -  -    -  -  -    (0.059)  (0.010)  (0.006) 
                        -3.338*  0.119 0.147    -2.196*  0.201 0.112    -1.994*  0.139 0.095  Average Village Household 
Dependency  Ratio  (0.939) (0.135) (0.104)  (0.936) (0.137) (0.092)  (0.912) (0.130) (0.114) 
                        -1.257* -0.015  0.105*  -0.738  0.033  0.075  -0.847  -0.030  0.094  CV of Village Household Dependency 
Ratio  (0.545) (0.067) (0.047)  (0.412) (0.078) (0.046)  (0.496) (0.064) (0.050) 
                        - - -    0.169*  0.019*  -0.010*    0.192*  0.010  -0.009  Log(Productive Assets Per Capita) 
-  -  -   (0.057) (0.008) (0.005)  (0.063) (0.009) (0.005) 
                        - - -    0.110  -0.077*  0.016    -0.059  -0.063  0.022  Share of Assets Managed by Collective 
-  -  -   (0.185) (0.030) (0.015)  (0.194) (0.035) (0.017) 
                        - - -    0.193  0.045  -0.028    -0.230  -0.004  -0.005  Productive Assets Per Capita Gini 
-  -  -   (0.281) (0.045) (0.026)  (0.326) (0.049) (0.029) 
                        N  100 100 100    100 100 100    100 100 100 
r2  0.669 0.580 0.439    0.689 0.581 0.438    0.741 0.644 0.477 
                                    Note:  All models include province year dummy variables and village location dummies (near city, in hills, and in mountains).  Robust standard errors 















































The Growth-Inequality Relationship in the Panel 
                          
 No  Instruments 
Measurement Error 
Instruments 
Lean Land          
Instruments 
Extended Land and 
Asset Instruments 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  RE  FE  FD  RE FE RE FE RE FE 
                    Lagged Gini (Income Per Capita)  0.051  0.115  0.069  0.048  0.138  0.042  0.041  -0.076  -0.136 
 (0.047)  (0.060)  (0.073)  (0.058)  (0.081) (0.129) (0.281) (0.092) (0.142) 
                    Lagged Log Income Per Capita   -0.079*  -0.187*  -0.226*  -0.048*  -0.142*  -0.043  -0.099  -0.022  -0.105* 
 (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.051) (0.023) (0.056) (0.016) (0.039) 
  Lagged Log Village Education Per Capita  0.054*  -0.016  -0.018  0.041*  -0.010  0.039*  -0.003  0.030  -0.002 
 (0.015)  (0.038)  (0.046)  (0.016)  (0.041) (0.017) (0.044) (0.016) (0.045) 
                    Lagged  Share  of  Income  from  Agriculture  -0.039*  -0.039  -0.030 -0.027 -0.023 -0.026 -0.018 -0.027 -0.036 
 (0.016)  (0.029)  (0.037)  (0.017)  (0.033) (0.019) (0.047) (0.018) (0.037) 
                    Hausman Test: RE vs FE  191.56    6.78  2.90  7.04 
  (0.000)    (1.270) (0.821) (0.317) 
                    Hausman Test: IV vs OLS        3.92  1.27  2.79  4.48  18.74  7.69 
        (0.995) (0.973) (1.000) (0.612) (0.344) (0.262) 
                    F-Test for Excluded Instruments (yt-1)        152.44  14.20 51.27  9.79 102.37 2.63 
        (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
                    F-Test for Excluded Instruments (Gt-1)       97.79 40.93 53.78  9.88  93.30  5.26 
        (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
                    Over-ID Test                  0.16  0.27  0.76  1.16  8.48  6.76 
          Chi-Probability        (0.690) (0.605) (0.675) (0.561) (0.487) (0.663) 
                    N  299  299  199 299 299 299 299 298 298 
r2  0.362  0.640  0.744  - - - - - - 
Note: All models include province and period dummy variables. Random effects models include village location dummy variables (nearcity, in hills, and in mountains).   
Robust, cluster corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. An asterisk (*) indicates a p-value of less than five percent. The instrument sets are described in detail 

















































Initial Inequality and the Growth of Income from Different Activities 
                                            
  OLS    IV:  Lean Cultivable Land Instruments    IV: Extended Instrument Set 
Model  (1) (2) (3)  (4)    (5) (6) (7)  (8)    (9) (10) (11)  (12) 
Variable  ln(Crop)  ln(NonAg)  ln(Wage)  ln(Bus)     ln(Crop)  ln(NonAg)  ln(Wage)  ln(Bus)     ln(Crop)  ln(NonAg)  ln(Wage)  ln(Bus) 
                              0.154 -0.264*  -0.309*  0.067    0.263 -0.653* -0.364  -0.654    0.105 -0.622*  -0.465*  -0.606  Gini (Income Per 
Capita)    (0.092) (0.080) (0.093)  (0.177)    (0.256) (0.187) (0.219)  (0.484)    (0.196) (0.152) (0.156)  (0.322) 
                             
-0.060*  -  -  -    -0.010 -  -  -    -0.026 -  -  -  ln(Crop Inc PC) 
  (0.014) -  -  -    (0.030) -  -  -    (0.027) -  -  - 
                             
- -0.030* -  -    - -0.034* -  -    - -0.037* -  -  ln(Non Ag Income 
PC)  - (0.009) -  -    - (0.013) -  -    - (0.012) -  - 
                             
- -  -0.042*  -    - -  -0.045*  -    - -  -0.050*  -  ln(Wage Income PC) 
- -  (0.007)  -    - -  (0.010)  -    - -  (0.009)  - 
                             
- - -  -0.053*    - - -  -0.042*    - - -  -0.043*  ln(HH Business Inc 
PC)  - - -  (0.009)    - - -  (0.021)    - - -  (0.015) 
0.048 0.064* 0.096*  -0.004    0.022 0.052* 0.096*  -0.031    0.026 0.055* 0.096*  -0.029  ln(Village Education 
PC)  (0.025) (0.025) (0.029)  (0.047)    (0.033) (0.027) (0.032)  (0.047)    (0.030) (0.027) (0.030)  (0.045) 
                             
0.175*  -0.020 -0.053  -0.049    0.073 -0.093 -0.073  -0.126    0.086 -0.098 -0.103  -0.121  Share of Income 
from  Agriculture  (0.044) (0.042) (0.046)  (0.058)    (0.092) (0.070) (0.068)  (0.093)    (0.075) (0.057) (0.055)  (0.065) 
                             
          3.19 9.99 6.38  4.09    2.32 8.12 6.65  5.30  F-Stat Initial Income 
Component:            (0.011) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.016) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
                             
F-Stat  Gini            3.07 3.07 3.07  3.07    2.65 2.65 2.65  2.65 
            (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.014)    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) 
                             
Over-ID            1.07 1.08 0.84  2.58    8.83 3.46 4.50  3.89 
     Chi-Probability            (0.783) (0.781) (0.841)  (4.590)    (0.453) (0.943) (0.876)  (0.919) 
                             
N  100 100 100  100    100 100 100  100    100 100 100  100 
r2  0.334  0.492  0.513  0.418     -  -  -  -     -  -  -  - 
Note:  All models include jointly significant province dummy variables and village location variables (nearcity, in hills, and in mountains).  Robust standard errors shown in 
parentheses. An asterisk (*) indicates a p-value of less than five percent. The instrument sets are described in detail in the notes to Table 4. In these specifications, initial 














































Is the Growth-Inequality Relationship Driven by Presence of TVEs? 
                                   
  OLS    IV:  Lean Land Instruments    IV: Extended Instrument Set 
Variable  ln(Inc)  ln(Crop)  ln(NonAg)     ln(Inc)  ln(Crop)  ln(NonAg)     ln(Inc)  ln(Crop)  ln(NonAg) 
                        -0.072  0.162 -0.266*    -0.261*  0.197 -0.729*    -0.208* 0.019 -0.494*  Gini (Income Per Capita) 
(0.048) (0.091) (0.080)    (0.124)  (0.297) (0.260)    (0.074) (0.214) (0.156) 
                       
ln(Vill Mean Inc Pc)  -0.054*  -  -    -0.057*  -  -    -0.054*  -  - 
  0.008  - -    (0.020)  - -    (0.014)  - - 
                       
ln(Crop Inc PC)  -  -0.054*  -    -  0.007  -    -  0.000  - 
  - (0.014) -    -  (0.043) -    - (0.039) - 
                       
-  - -0.033*    -  - -0.042*    -  - -0.044*  ln(Non Ag Income PC) 
-  - (0.009)    -  - (0.015)    -  - (0.012) 
                       
0.002 -0.002 0.003    0.002  -0.005 0.003    0.002 -0.004 0.003  Number of TVEs in 1993 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)    (0.001)  (0.003) (0.002)    (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
                       
0.047* 0.052* 0.056*    0.040* 0.026  0.042    0.041* 0.022  0.051*  ln(Village Education PC) 
(0.013) (0.025) (0.027)    (0.015)  (0.034) (0.029)    (0.014) (0.031) (0.027) 
                       
-0.026 0.148* -0.018    -0.055 0.000  -0.116    -0.046 -0.010 -0.085  Share of Income from 
Agriculture  (0.018) (0.049) (0.042)    (0.031)  (0.123) (0.085)    (0.024) (0.111) (0.060) 
                       
- - -    3.70  2.13  2.29    2.93  1.33  6.98  F-Stat Initial Income 
Component: -  -  -    (0.005)  (0.070)  (0.053)    (0.003)  (0.223)  (0.000) 
                       
F-Stat Gini  -  -  -    2.35  2.35  2.35    3.04  3.04  3.04 
 -  -  -    (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)    (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
                       
Over-ID -  -  -    1.98  0.35  1.86    3.48  10.24  7.89 
     (Chi-Probability)  -  -  -    (0.576)  (0.950)  (0.602)    (0.942)  (0.331)  (0.545) 
                       
T-Statistics on Share of Assets Collective in:                   
Reduced Form Growth  -  -  -    -  -  -    1.26  0.67  0.24 
First Stage for Gini  -  -  -    -  -  -    -3.01  -3.01  -3.01 
First Stage for ln(income)  -  -  -    -  -  -    -0.72  0.99  0.07 
                       
N  100  100  100   100  100  100  100  100  100 
r2  0.334  0.492  0.513     -  -  -     -  -  - 
Instruments: 
Lean Land Instruments (The Lean Set): Cultivated land gini, cultivated land per capita, other land per capita, village average dependency ratio, 
coefficient of variation of household dependency ratios. 
Extended Land Instruments and Asset Instruments (The Fat Set): Lean land instruments, plus ln(productive assets per capita), gini (productive assets per 
capita), share of village assets controlled by collective, percent of hh other land (forest or fishpond land), percent with other land interacted with other 
land per capita, share of cultivated land managed by collective, and share of other land managed by the collective. 
Notes:  All models include jointly significant province dummy variables and village location dummy variables.  Robust standard errors shown in 
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Table 9 
Household Income Growth and Interactions Between Initial Income and Inequality 
                          
 OLS     
HH ME & Lean 
Land Instruments 
& Interactions    
HH ME & Extended 
Farm and Asset 
Instruments & 
Interactions 
Model 1  2      3 4      5 6 
                  -0.102*  0.160    -0.241 -0.494    -0.257* -0.651  Gini (Income Per Capita)  
(0.045) (0.294)    (0.151) (1.225)    (0.106) (0.773) 
                  - -0.042    - 0.040    - 0.066  (Income Gini)*ln(Household Income 
Per Capita)  -  (0.048)    - (0.200)    - (0.125) 
                  0.021* 0.019*    0.047 0.054*    0.033 0.049*  ln(Village Average Income Per Capita) 
(0.007) (0.007)    (0.030) (0.027)    (0.022) (0.018) 
                  -0.075*  -0.063*    -0.066* -0.085    -0.060* -0.096*  ln(Household Income Per Capita) 
(0.003) (0.013)    (0.019) (0.052)    (0.018) (0.036) 
                  -0.024 -0.023    -0.037 -0.040    -0.040 -0.041  Share of Village Income From 
Agriculture (0.015)  (0.015)    (0.032) (0.029)    (0.025) (0.021) 
                  0.044* 0.045*    0.039* 0.038*    0.041* 0.039*  ln(Village Average Education Per 
Capita) (0.014)  (0.014)    (0.017) (0.016)    (0.017) (0.016) 
                  F-Stat Income Gini  -  -    4.26 3.42    4.71 11.62 
 -  -    (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
                  F-Stat Gini-ln(HH IPC) Interaction  -  -    - 4.62    - 13.45 
 -  -    - (0.000)   - (0.000) 
                  F-Stat ln (HH IPC)  -  -    11.29 7.17    18.30 12.83 
 -  -    (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
                  F-Stat ln(Village IPC)  -  -    5.20 3.44    11.45 9.98 
 -  -    (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
                  Over-ID -  -    1.60 113.50   11.45  91.40 
     (Chi-Probability)  -  -    (0.659) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
     Degrees of Freedom        3 8    9 28 
                              N   4434  4434    4434 4434    4434  4434 
           r2   0.4432  0.4439     - -      - - 
Instruments:  
Model 3:  Household measurement error instruments (HH ME) include ln(1+wage income per capita) and ln(1+ 
household non-agricultural income per capita), plus lean land instruments for the gini (income) and income: 
Cultivated land gini, cultivated land per capita, other land per capita, village average dependency ratio, coefficient 
of variation of household dependency ratios. 
Model 4:  Model 3 instruments and interactions between household and village level instruments. 
Model 5:  Model 3 instruments plus the following village level instruments: ln(productive assets per capita), gini 
(productive assets per capita), share of village assets controlled by collective, percent of hh other land (forest or 
fishpond land), percent with other land interacted with other land per capita, share of cultivated land managed by 
collective, and share of other land managed by the collective 
Model 6: Model 5 instruments and interactions between household and village level instruments. 
Notes:  Household controls (not shown) in Models 1 and 2 include ln(HH average education per capita), household 
size, household dependency ratio, male share of working age adults, household cultivated land per capita, ln(value 
of household assets per capita.  All models include province dummy variables and three location dummy variables: 
for whether the village is near a city, in the mountains, or in the hills. Robust, cluster corrected standard errors in 
parentheses.  An asterisk (*) indicates a p-value of less than five percent. 
 Table 10 
Is Their a Relationship Between Village Revenues or Expenditures and Inequality? 
  
  Dep Var: ln(village revenue per capita)    Dep Var: ln(village expenditures per capita) 
Model  1 2 3    4 5 6 















                Gini (Income Per Capita)  -0.76  -1.89  -4.80    -0.86  -1.75  -4.91 
  (1.82) (2.13) (4.23)    (1.78) (2.07) (4.16) 
                Ln(Village Income Per Capita)  1.17*  1.38*  1.96*    1.18*  1.37*  2.02* 
  (0.26) (0.34) (0.30)    (0.25) (0.32) (0.30) 
0.88 0.73 0.33    0.83 0.70 0.26  Ln(Village Average Ed Per 
Capita)  (0.71) (0.75) (0.81)    (0.66) (0.70) (0.77) 
                -1.69* -1.82* -2.14*    -1.60* -1.70* -2.05*  Agricultural Income as a Share 
of Total Income  (0.52)  (0.52)  (0.83)    (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.82) 
                Over-Identification            
     Chi-Square Statistic    3.53 23.20      3.43 21.86 
     (Chi-Probability)    (0.062)  (0.012)      (0.064)  (0.020) 
                The First Stage               
     Ln(Vill IPC)    F-Test    17.21  11.01      17.21  11.01 
                             (F-
Probability)    (0.000) (0.000)      (0.000) (0.000) 
                     IPC Gini          F-Test    31.66  6.41      31.66  6.41 
                             (F-
Probability)    (0.000) (0.000)      (0.000) (0.000) 
                N  100 100 100    100 100 100 
R2  0.57  -- --    0.58  -- -- 
                       
Instruments: 
Measurement Error Instruments: Ninety/ten income per capita ratio, seventy-five/twenty-five income per capita ratio, ln(average wage 
income per capita). 
Extended Land Instruments and Asset Instruments: ln(productive assets per capita), gini (productive assets per capita), share of village 
assets controlled by collective, cultivated land gini, cultivated land per capita, other land per capita, village average dependency ratio, 
coefficient of variation of household dependency ratios, percent of hh other land (forest or fishpond land), percent with other land 
interacted with other land per capita, share of cultivated land managed by collective, and share of other land managed by the 
collective. 
Notes:  All models include jointly significant province dummy variables and village location dummy variables.  Robust standard 















































Is Their a Relationship the Structure of Village Public Finances and Inequality? 
  
Dependent Variable  ln(Village Tax & Fees Per Capita)    Weighted Average Village Tax Rate    
(Tax Rate of Upper 25%)/(Tax Rate of 
Lower 25%) 
Model 1  2  3    4 5  6    7 8  9 


















                Gini (Income Per Capita)  2.291  2.732  2.329    0.078 0.092  0.169    -1.287 -1.567*  -1.985 
 (1.912)  (1.626)  (2.648)    (0.055) (0.050)  (0.087)    (0.652) (0.515)  (1.848) 
                      Ln(Village Income Per Capita)  0.936*  0.440  0.897    -0.016* -0.025  -0.015    0.033 -0.036 -0.016 
 (0.261)  (0.400)  (0.368)    (0.008) (0.013)  (0.013)    (0.087) (0.121)  (0.136) 
-0.299 -0.037  -0.278    -0.007 -0.002  -0.004    0.008 0.039  0.018  Ln(Village Average Ed Per 
Capita) (0.499)  (0.465) (0.435)    (0.014) (0.014)  (0.015)    (0.168) (0.169)  (0.199) 
                      2.196* 2.231*  2.199*    0.048* 0.048*  0.060*    -0.231 -0.266  -0.319  Agricultural Income as a Share 
of Total Income  (0.606)  (0.627) (0.624)    (0.017) (0.018)  (0.019)    (0.202) (0.207)  (0.346) 
                Over-Identification                    
     Chi-Square Statistic    1.16 22.43     0.74  25.60     0.76  5.65 
     (Chi-Probability)    (0.282)  (0.013)     (0.391)  (0.004)     (0.384)  (0.844) 
                      The First Stage                     
     Ln(Vill IPC)    F-Test    17.21  11.01     17.21  11.01     15.50  8.83 
                             (F-Probability)  (0.000)  (0.000)     (0.000)  (0.000)     (0.000)  (0.000) 
                           IPC Gini          F-Test    31.66  6.41     31.66  6.41     32.00  5.44 
                             (F-Probability)  (0.000)  (0.000)     (0.000)  (0.000)     (0.000)  (0.000) 
                N 99  99  99    100 100  100    96 96  96 
R2 0.423  -  -    0.305 -  -    0.244 -  - 
                                   
Instruments: 
Measurement Error Instruments: Ninety/ten income per capita ratio, seventy-five/twenty-five income per capita ratio, ln(average wage income per capita). 
Extended Land Instruments and Asset Instruments: ln(productive assets per capita), gini (productive assets per capita), share of village assets controlled by collective, 
cultivated land gini, cultivated land per capita, other land per capita, village average dependency ratio, coefficient of variation of household dependency ratios, 
percent of hh other land (forest or fishpond land), percent with other land interacted with other land per capita, share of cultivated land managed by collective, and 
share of other land managed by the collective. 
Notes:  All models include jointly significant province dummy variables and village location dummy variables.  Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. An 
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Figure 1 
The Distribution of Growth Rates for Real Household Per Capita Income 
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Note: vertical lines indicate the 10
th, 50
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th percentiles (-0.036, 0.033, and 0.103) 
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The Relationship Between Initial Inequality and Subsequent Growth 
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